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HILE the phrase "great power requires great responsibility"Wstill remains an outstanding statement, it is indeed an impor-
tant issue regarding governance policy, debt management, and
monetary policy. For example, in the aftermath of the Great Depression
and World War II, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became a
very important global financial framework.1 It took on important respon-
sibilities, which sometimes exceeded expectations. 2
The IMF plays an important role as an international monetary frame-
work, existing primarily to support its member countries with adequate
financial arrangements. Hence, given the monetary situation of its mem-
bers facing financial problems, the structural conditionality that was es-
tablished to help will be a paramount mechanism in the years to come as
the international community faces financial turbulence. 3
* L.L.M (SMU, U.S.A.), M.B.A (FGV, Brazil), LL.B (UNIGRANRIO, Brazil), Re-
search Fellow of the Law Institute of the Americas (SMU), Lawyer, Bank Compli-
ance Officer, Senior Bank Manager (ABN AMRO BANK, Brazil). The author
may be contacted by e-mail at edneiroza@gmail.com.
1. For more about the IMF and an analysis of its history, see generally Michel
Camdessus, Managing Dir. of the Int'l Monetary Fund, The Role of the IMF: Past,
Present, and Future, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Bretton Woods Com-
mittee (Feb. 13, 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/
021398.htm [hereinafter The Role of the IMF]. As for a portrait of the IMF, see
Manuel Guitiin, The Unique Nature of the Responsibilities of the International
Monetary Fund, IMF PAMPHLET SERIES No. 46 (1992), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pam/pam46/pam46con.htm.
2. For example, when the IMF's role had come under criticism, such as on the exten-
sive structural reform agenda of recent Fund-support programs in the Asia coun-
tries. For a comprehensive overview of the Fund-Support program, see POLICY
DEP'T & REVIEW DEP'T, INT'L MONETARY FUND, STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY
IN FuND-SuPPORTED PROGRAMS (2001), available at http:www.imf.org/external/
np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/struct/ [hereinafter IMF FUND-SUPPORT PROGRAM 2001]
3. For the purpose of this paper, it is important to refer to the Introductory Article of
the International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement as to either a better or
thorough understanding of the primary purpose with which the IMF was
established.
The Governments on whose behalf the present Agreement is signed
agree as follows:
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This paper focuses on IMF conditionality and its support program in
Brazil, as well as its impact, the legal issues involved, and most impor-
tantly, the perspectives regarding the Brazilian economy and
macroeconomic policies. Moreover, this paper delves into the concept of
the IMF and the remaining challenges in the ongoing recovery of the Bra-
zilian economy. As such, Brazil moves into a position it has never been
in before. Brazilian officials are considering whether or not to renew the
stand-by arrangement that was approved by the IMF in September 2002. 4
Consequently, the international community, the IMF, and investors are
all concerned about the changes this decision could bring about-taking
into consideration that major changes remain to be made in Brazil-and
the future perspectives regarding the relationship between Brazil and the
IMF.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE IMF
The IMF was established in the aftermath of World War II in 1945
primarily to help the international community with monetary problems
and to prevent the recurrence of such episodes that took place at that
(i) The International Monetary Fund is established and shall operate
in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement as originally
adopted and subsequently amended.
(ii) To enable the Fund to conduct its operation and transactions, the
Fund shall maintain a General Department and a Special Drawing
Rights Department. Membership in the Fund shall give the right to
participation in the Special Drawing Rights Department
(iii) Operations and transactions authorized by this Agreement shall
be conducted through the General Department, consisting in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Agreement of the General Resources
Account, the Special Disbursement Account, and the Investment Ac-
count; except that operations and transactions involving special draw-
ing rights shall be conducted through the Special Drawing Rights
Department.
International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement, July 22, 1944, http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm [hereinafter IMF Articles of
Agreement].
4. At that time, Brazilian officials were considering whether or not to renew the
stand-by arrangement that was approved by the IMF in September 2002. This was
the first time, after eight years, that Brail has been free from IMF regarding finan-
cial support. Although international economy is undergoing significant changes
and the crisis affecting developing countries is becoming a dynamic concept. The
Minister of Finance of Brazil has defended to the fact that IMF should created a
prevention instrument to provide emerging markets a quick provision as necessary
as possible. For a whole consideration from Minister of Finance of Brail, see: Mr.
Guido Mantega, Minister of Fin., Braz. on behalf of Braz., Colom., Dom. Rep.,
Ecuador, Guy., Haiti, Pan., Surin., Trin. & Tobago, Statement at the International
Monetary and Financial Committee, Seventeenth Meeting, (Apr. 12, 2008), availa-
ble at http://www.imf.org/External/spring/2008/imfc/statement/engfbra.pdf. See
also Press Release, Executive Bd. of Dir., Int'l Monetary Fund, Executive Board
Completes Final Review Under Brazil's Stand-By Arrangement (March 22, 2005),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2005/pr0564.htm [hereinafter
IMF March 2005 Press Release]
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time.5 But the IMF governors established a basic, but very important
concept to help members deal with economic deficit. The IMF, to the
extent that it relied on concepts imposed by Bretton Woods' methodol-
ogy, therefore had to set basic rules to support its members, which are:
6
(i) To review and monitor national and global economic and finan-
cial developments and advise members on their economic policies;
(ii) To lend them hard currencies to support adjustment and reform
policies designed to correct balance of payments problems and pro-
mote sustainable growth; and
(iii) To offer a wide range of technical assistance, as well as train for
government and central bank officials, in its areas of expertise.
7
Although the IMF was established to support exchange stability and to
create an exchange arrangement that provided temporary financial assis-
tance and promoted economic growth, 8 changes remained to be made.
5. See Guitiin, supra note 1, at 4. The Bretton Woods Agreement entered into force
in 1945 and the IMF came into existence precisely (ready to operation) in October
1946. Besides the establishment of the IMF, the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD), which is the World Bank, was also created
pro financial support. At that time, twenty nine countries had signed the Article of
Agreement. Structurally, the IMF issued the Articles of Agreements which were
created to govern the IMF and provide core values and principles as a financial
framework for primarily emerging and developing countries. Article I of Articles
of Agreements sets forth the purposes of the IM,F which are:
1) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collabora-
tion on international monetary problems.
2) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of
high levels of employment and real income and to the development of
the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of eco-
nomic policy.
3) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrange-
ments among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
4) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in
respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination
of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.
5) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of
the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus
providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their bal-
ance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national
or international prosperity.
6) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the
degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of
members.
IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 3, art. I. The IMF "shall be guided in all its
policies and decisions by the purposes set forth in this Article. Id. Moreover, ac-
cording to Michel Camdessus, in countries that adhered to these instructions,
"[t]rade expanded briskly, national incomes rose, and employment grew, bringing
the world a half century of unparalleled prosperity." See The Role of the IMF,
supra note 1; see also IMF Articles of Agreements, available at http://www.imf.orgl
external/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf.
6. For the full story of the IMF, see The IMF Story, FIN. & DEV. 14 (Sept. 2004),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/O9/pdf/timeline.pdf; see
also The Role of the IMF, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. See Guitidin, supra note 1.
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For example, international financial stability was far from reaching a solid
and secure position; therefore, the IMF itself had to recognize that it was
not sufficient to combat the vulnerability taking place at that time.9 Later
in 1961 under the Bretton Woods Conference, the members created the
General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and added into the structure of
the IMF the ability to assist the financial transactions of countries in
need. 10 Furthermore, the Basel Agreement, which came into existence as
part of this whole financial mechanism, was created to support the inter-
national community by primarily providing mutual credits during the fi-
nancial crisis.11 But considering that the world economy has gone up and
down due to various reasons, the IMF and the World Bank have contin-
ued to be the most important financial frameworks to foster the growth in
developing countries. 12
According to Camdessus, in order to have a more feasible financial
architecture able to restore the international financial system, the mem-
ber countries should not only consider the IMF as "simply a source of
financing or mechanism for crisis management", but also as the financial
counselor as for "an in-depth analysis of the economy and policy ad-
vice."'13 Although the word "discretion114 has been the center of discus-
sion regarding the implied conditionality upon emerging markets, the
international financial atmosphere has developed internal efforts in an
attempt to consolidate and minimize its risk. 15 For example, the 1944
efforts of Brazilian authorities and other countries to make more feasible
measures on behalf of the economic development did not echo in the
debates at the Bretton Woods Conference. 16 But the agreements of the
constitution of the FMI did not make any distinction whatsoever between
developed countries and countries in development.1 7
In 2004, a press release by the Development Committee of the IMF
and the World Bank asserted that developing countries had successfully




12. See The Role of the IMF, supra note 1. For comprehensive material regarding the
perspectives and analysis of the World Bank in Brazil, see ANGUS MADDISON &
ASSOCIATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY, EQUITY, AND GROWTH,
BRAZIL AND MEXICO (1992); see also Edward M. Bernstein, The Early Years of the
International Monetary Fund, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICY: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF JACQUES J. POLAK 58 (Jacob A. Frenkel & Morris Goldstein eds.,
1991).
13. See The Role of the IMF, supra note 1.
14. For the use of the word "discretion" discussing the IMF's existence and applicabil-
ity of its conditionality, see Guitiin, supra note 1, at 8-10.
15. Id.
16. See PAULO ROBERTO DE ALMEIDA, RELA(;OES INTERNACIONAIS E POLtTICA EX-
TERNA DO BRASIL: HISTORIA E SOCIOLOGIA DA DIPLOMACIA BRASILEIRA [Inter-
national Relation and External Politc of Brazil: History and Sociology of the
Brazilian Diplomacy], ch. IV (2002).
17. Id.
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transitioned into an incredible growth. 18 The Joint Committee also stated
that the world economy was growing stronger and was supported by espe-
cially healthy growth in developing countries.19 It also concluded that
significant reforms undertaken by many countries in recent years had
considerable impact on their satisfactory growth.2 0
Among these results, which have been measured by the success of de-
veloping countries' growth, is the enhancement of the private sector.2 1
Higher taxes revenues and job offers have contributed to these favorable
numbers that can be useful, inclusively, to reduce the amount of global
poverty according to the IMF and the World Bank. 22 Despite the fact
that there are many criticisms of the policy and conditionalities applied
by the IMF and World Bank, mainly based on the argument that develop-
ing third world countries had an increased dependency on richer na-
tions,23 the global market has grown considerably.
18. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund & World Bank, Report to the Boards of Gov-
ernors of the Fund and the Bank by the Hon. Trevor Manuel, Chairman of the
Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors on the Transfer of Real
Resources to Developing Countries (Oct. 3, 2004) available at http://www.imf.org/
external/am/2004/speeches/pr05e.pdf [hereinafter IMF and World Bank Develop-
ment Committee Release]. As for the relation between the IFM and World Bank,
see Ibrahim F.I., Shihata, The World Bank and the IMF Relationship-Quo Vadis?,
35 INT'L L. 1349 (2001).
19. IMF and World Bank Development Committee Release, supra note 18
20. Id. Furthermore, on the performance of the global economic growth, see UNITED
NATIONS, WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 2005 (2005) available at
http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/index.html [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS RE-
PORT 20051.
21. See UNITED NATIONS REPORT 2005, supra note 20.
22. Id.
23. In an article titled Structural Adjustment-A Major Cause of Poverty by Anup
Shah, the author quoted a statement that captures the essence of the several issues
raised by the international community regarding their criticisms, which I point out
here:
Debt is an efficient tool. It ensures access to other peoples' raw materi-
als and infrastructure on the cheapest possible terms. Dozens of coun-
tries must compete for shrinking export markets and can export only a
limited range of products because of Northern protectionism and their
lack of cash to invest in diversification. Market saturation ensues, reduc-
ing exporters' income to a bare minimum while the North enjoys huge
savings. The IMF cannot seem to understand that investing in . . . [a]
healthy, well-fed, literate population ... is the most intelligent economic
choice a country can make.
Anup Shah, Structural Adjustment-A Major Cause of Poverty, GLOBAL ISSUES,
July 16, 2003, http://www.globalissues.orglTradeRelated/SAP.asp?p=l (quoting Su-
SAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT 143, 187, 235 (New York: Grove Wei-
denfeld, 1990)). Nevertheless, considering that this statement under circumstances
that some developing and third world countries have faced and perhaps, if the
structural policies on those countries have been erroneously caused their increased
debt, I leave this discussion on as to whether those countries, which considered
themselves unfairly prejudiced by the entity's imposed conditionalities and their
governance policies, have or have not been willing to follow the structure set to
help their financial problems. Thus, such a discussion can be taken apart from the
purpose of this paper, which is mainly based on the argument that developing
countries and the "third" world countries have increasingly depended on the richer
nations.
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B. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY CRISIS: IN BRIEF
Extensive chaos brought about by an international monetary crisis
likely would have devastating economic consequences similar to the
Great Depression of the 1930s, which left behind financial agony among
the international community. But other major monetary crises should
also be mentioned. 24
In 1974, for example, the Group of Ten industrialized countries (G10)
took two important actions to protect the international financial system.
The G10 wanted to create a mechanism capable of maintaining controlled
economic stability. 25 The Development Communiqu6, created by the
IMF and the World Bank Group, provided member countries with
enough information on economic stabilization and a regulatory scheme
capable of supervising the development practices of the international
community. It intended that distribution of such information would help
members avoid similar financial crises, particularly in the banking
system.26
Indeed, considering the new era of major crisis, when the Mexican Fi-
nance Minister made clear that Mexico could default on its repayment
obligation, the international community and the IMF underwent strenu-
ous negotiations to prevent what was considered "smoke;" unfortunately,
the "fire" of the crisis lasted more than a decade.27 But the story of debt
crisis did not begin with the Mexican crisis of the 1980s. 28 For instance,
Boughton wisely lists the origins of the crises chronologically as follows: 29
1. "the severance of the dollar-gold linkage in 1971"
24. Professor Joseph Norton points out some of the main causes for the international
crisis. He states that the crisis happened because it "was generated by fundamen-
tal economic, political, and financial market errors and weaknesses, and also by
exaggerated and disproportionate market reaction to these vulnerabilities." For a
complete approach by Professor Norton, see Joseph J. Norton, A "NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE?"-REFLECTIONS ON THE POSSIBLE LAW-
BASED DIMENSION, 33 INT'L L. 891 (1999). Furthermore, for an overview of the
Brazilian Crisis of 1990s, see Jorge M. Guira, Preventing and Containing Interna-
tional Financial Crisis: The Case of Brazil 7 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 481 (2001).
25. See GEORGE ALEXANDER WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION:
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 17, 30 (2001); see also generally INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW UPON ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM: A
TRIBUTE TO SIR JOSEPH AND RUTH GOLD (Joseph J. Norton & Mads Andenas
eds., 2002).
26. See WALKER, supra note 25, at 30. Moreover, on bank supervision, see JOSEPH J.
NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS (1995). For
discussion on the International Financial Institutions (IFI) and the legal reforms of
the IMF as well as perspectives of financial institutions, see for example, Joseph J.
Norton, International Financial Institutions and the Movement Toward Greater Ac-
countability and Transparency: The Case of Legal Reform Programmes and the
Problem of Evaluation, 35 INT'L L. 1443 (2001) [hereinafter Norton, International
Financial Institutions].
27. See JAMES M. BOUGHTON, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE INTERNATIONAL MONE-
TARY FUND 1979-1989 (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/his-
tory/2001/index.htm.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 269.
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2. "the shift to floating exchange rates in 1973"
3. "the first oil-shock" between 1973 and early 1974
4. "the ensuing slowdown in the mid-1970s"
5. "the inflationary binge of the late 1970s that [caused] the second
oil shock of 1979-80
6. the "monetary contraction in the US (the 'Volcker Shock')".
In addition, potential external and internal barriers to these develop-
ments are seen by developing communities as the most difficult issues to
deal with in accomplishing their goals of economic development. 30 For
example, Cipher and Dietz identified existing distribution of income and
wealth, the infrastructure development such as roads, electricity, water,
communications, and organized banking and financial institutions as ma-
jor internal barriers for growth within a developing country.3 1
Moreover, Cipher and Dietz also point out some external barriers that
have made a huge impact on the development of those countries, such as
major corporations retaining control over the country's resources, inter-
national labor and the method of dealing with international trade and its
system, and most importantly, the role of the IMF and the World Bank as
functioning structures upon their members. 32 Hence, the "say" imposed
by the international community and richer countries is to play with inter-
est rates on trade (considered as tariffs or non-tariff barriers).33
The authors of an IMF work paper titled Stabilization and Reform in
Latin America: A Macroeconomic Perspective on the Experience Since the
Early 1990s (2005) sparked controversy by stating that a "cyclical weak-
ness in the industrial countries" and the consequent improvements of
"the external environment in the early 1990s" contributed satisfactorily to
the excellent performance of the Latin America countries. 34 A good ex-
ample is the Brazilian Oil Crisis of 1980s. Unlike Mexico, Brazil was al-
ready involved in international transactions as an oil importer at the
beginning of the 1980s when the oil shock occurred. 35 The crisis affected
major countries, particularly Mexico, as Mexican authorities undertook
large loans with investors to promote oil production in hopes of increas-
ing economic and social developments. 36 Controversially, the 1980s oil-
shock triggered the economic development in Brazil.3 7
30. For a thorough comprehensive approach on the economic development in emerg-
ing markets, see JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 2004).
31. Id. at 20-21.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Anoop Singh et al., Stabilization and Reform in Latin America: A
Macroeconomic Perspective on the Experience Since the Early 1990s (Int'l Mone-
tary Fund, Occasional Paper 238, 2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/op/238/index.htm.
35. See BOUGHTON, supra note 27.
36. See CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 30, at 479.
37. In the 1980s, Brazil was a major producer of oil and derivatives. Brazil had its own
rich sources of crude oil, which were favored in the middle of the turbulence that
occurred in the international sphere due to the oil shock. But it should be men-
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C. THE BRAZILIAN CURRENCY CRISIS IN THE 1990s
By 1994, Brazil had suffered one of its major crises. In the wake of the
Asian and Russian crises of the 1990s, Brazil had to change its fixed ex-
change rate regime to a major (flexible) regime, notwithstanding the huge
impact it would have on the economy either internally or internationally,
and Brazil would have to undertake its commitments with investors as
well as with the IMF's structural conditionality. 38 Under the then Presi-
dent Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, Brazil successfully sta-
bilized its economy by bringing Brazilian currency to equality with the
U.S. dollar for a temporary period. 39 With the stabilization of the econ-
omy, as well as the currency deflation, Brazil began attracting foreign in-
vestors and its economy started to grow. But by the middle of 2002,
Brazil almost fell into another major financial crisis when left wing politi-
cal forces raised speculation and fears about the economic policies ad-
vanced during the previous presidential elections.40
Therefore, Brazilian authorities resorted to defensive measures to
maintain and stabilize the economy to keep the international flow of fi-
nancial capital coming in. More interestingly though, the IMF set its ar-
rangements before the 2002 presidential election; and the three major
candidates accepted responsibility to maintain the fiscal and monetary
framework as already established by the IMF.41
Since the currency devaluation occurred in 1999, Brazil, under the Lula
administration in 2002, had to make suitable arrangements to stabilize its
economy. According to the governor of the Central Bank of Brazil,
Henrique Meirelles, the economic policy adopted by the Brazilian gov-
ernment was a result of a process by which the country could steadily
reduce the public debt to approximately forty percent compared to sixty
tioned that in the oil crisis of the 1970s, Brazil suffered a huge impact in its econ-
omy for not yet being structured.
38. The First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Anne Krueger, stated in a speech
titled How Stable is the Global Economy, that Brazil's "underlying macroeconomic
policies were judged to be sound" and that, although "uncertainty led to concerns
about the sustainability of Brazil's large public debt," another major concern was
"whether [the] new government would maintain sound macro policies." Anne 0.
Krueger, Address at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research: How
Stable is the Global Economy? (Feb. 11, 2005), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/speeches/2OO5/021105.htm [hereinafter Krueger Address 2005].
39. The Real Plan, which was the name given by the government for the new eco-
nomic policy in 1994, was the main strategy made by the Brazilian authorities in an
attempt to cement the economy by stabilizing the new currency with the U.S. dol-
lar. At that time the Brazilian real was tied to the dollar (one to one), and the
inflation rate came down from around 600 percent annual rate to less than 29
percent in the last quarter of 2002. See Henrique DeCampos Meirelles, Viewpoint,
Past Lessons Learnt, Hope for the Future, BANKER, FIN. TIMES Bus. LIMITED, Jan.
1, 2004, 2004 WLNR 4818170; see also WALKER, supra note 25, at 30.
40. See Krueger Address 2005, supra note 38.
41. According to Krueger, Brazil jointly with the IMF's program made an outstanding
transformation in the Brazilian economy. Id.
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percent in 2001.42 Brazil was indeed experiencing a solid process of pub-
lic accounts adjustment.43 But in 2002 an inflationary surge had huge im-
pact on the economy, and the level of inflation rose by a factor of five.44
Nevertheless, the Lula administration undertook a strategy of fiscal re-
sponsibility along with macroeconomic stability-which was a require-
ment of the IMF's structural conditionality-to overcome the crisis and a
new threat that inflation was making a comeback. 45
Brazil has paved the way for positive growth.46 According to a new
survey made by the OECD, Brazil has done pretty well recovering from
its financial instability of 2002. 4 7 The GDP is expected to rise by 5 per-
cent in 2004, which according to economists is the fastest expansion in ten
years.48 Furthermore, strengthening of institutions and the fiscal respon-
sibility legislation promoted by the Lula administration led Brazil's econ-
omy toward constructive and solid growth.49 Yet, Brazil must maintain
the consolidation of macroeconomic stabilization as an essential element
for moving forward with improved confidence and equitable growth.50
Finally, as to a successful recovery from its crises, Brazil responded by
applying a tighter fiscal policy, a tighter monetary policy, as well as exter-
nal financial support. 51 According to Arminio Fraga, who is a former
Governor of Central Bank of Brazil, the "implementation of inflation
targeting in Brazil is off to a promising start."'52 Furthermore, the adop-
tion by the IMF of a consultation mechanism on inflation targets-which
occurred in the last revision of the program- stresses the soundness of
our current monetary policy. 53
III. IMF CONDITIONALITY AND SOME LEGAL ISSUES
A. SCOPE OF CONDITIONALITY
As Manuel Guitiin said in 1995, "of particular importance within this
evolution has been the existence of a general consensus that the IMF's
financial assistance should be conditional on the adoption and implemen-
42. See Meirelles, supra note 39. Under the Lula administration, Brazil has shown
solid growth and commitment to the construction of a new future with both sus-




46. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. (OECD), Macroeconomic Policies: Pav-
ing the way for Sustained Growth, in 2005 OECD ECONOMIC SURVEY OF BRAZIL,
(2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/52/0,2340,en_2649_201185_3441
5156_1_1_1_1,00.html. [hereinafter OECD SURVEY OF BRAZIL 2005].




51. See Arminio Fraga, Monetary Policy During the Transition to a Floating Exchange
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tation of adjustment policies. '54
Conditionality involves the exercise of financial support to help mem-
ber countries to overcome their balance of payments during the process
of reform. 55 Structural conditionality defines whether the recipient coun-
try has used the IMF's resources in accordance with the arrangements
previously set by the agreement, along with the purposes and provisions
of the Article of Agreement. 56 Furthermore, extensive efforts have been
made to achieve a more stable international financial system. The IMF
imposed different conditionalities based primarily on the types of balance
of payments problems.57
Manuel Guitiin explains that "[t]he concept of conditionality" of the
IMF "is defined as one of the important dimensions of the cooperative
nature of the [IMF] as an institution". 58 The IMF's main responsibility,
therefore, is to assist its members in overcoming their debt management
by providing them with some sort of financial assistance. 59 Nevertheless,
the conditionality is so much more important than the meaning itself. For
example, legal reforms involving the IMF support program, such as a
stand-by facility, imposes a large burden on the recipient country, which
is required to implement reforms.60
The important concern of the IMF is to certify that member countries
have developed the IMF's contribution, such as technical assistance on
monetary exchange, as well as fiscal and legal issues. 61 For instance, Bra-
zil's constitution has undergone several constitutional changes since it
54. Manuel Guitign, Conditionality: Past, Present and Future, 42 IMF STAFF PAPERS
792, 793-94 (1995).
55. See id. at 813.
56. See IMF FUND-SUPPORT-PROGRAM 2001, supra note 2, at 5. By simply saying that
developing countries have become more competitive as far as their ability to re-
store the monetary policy and for doing business abroad, for instance, interna-
tional assistance offered by the IMF and World Bank has undoubtedly become a
paramount source to provide its members accessibility in order to help the devel-
opment and have solid growth. The IMF has been criticized for the conditionality
applied to its members. Brazil, for example, has undergone a favorable situation
by which its authorities are considering whether or not to use the draft set by the
IMF to continue the ongoing recovery process. According to Guitiin, in order to
fulfill its responsibilities, the IMF should temporally "develop procedures and
reach understandings with its members to use the resource of the institution." See
Manuel Guitigin, Fiscal Adjustment, Debt Management, and Conditionality, in Fis-
CAL POLICY, ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 112, 126 (Mario
Monti ed., 1989) [hereinafter Guitiin, Fiscal Adjustment]. For example, Brazil
since its plea for financial support, has undergone-and this has changed slightly
for a few years-important, however, difficult changes. For a deeper approach on
the conditionality of the IMF, see Guitiin, Conditionality, supra note 54.
57. See Franqois Gianviti, Evolving Role and Challenges for the International Monetary
Fund, 35 INT'L L. 1371, 1395 (2001).
58. See Guiti~n, Fiscal Adjustment, supra note 56. Mr. Guitiin is Associate Director
of the Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department of the IMF. For an extensive
discussion of the perspectives, the rationale for conditionality and its analytical
framework, see Guitign, Conditionality, supra note 54.
59. See Guitiin, Fiscal Adjustment, supra note 56, at 126.
60. See Norton, International Financial Institutions, supra note 26, at 1458.
61. See Guitiin, Conditionality, supra note 54, at 813.
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was enacted in 1988 in order to fulfill IMF requirements for economic
and political policies.62
Additionally, under the IMF programs, conditionality is per se related
to "the achievement of a set of policy objectives and the continuous ac-
cess to IMF resources. ' 63 The policy objectives, however, vary from
country to country.64 Thus, the conditionality at its core helps countries
to develop financial discipline and provides the IMF with a safeguard to
verify a country's performance with the money invested.65
The principal conflict, however, between members and the IMF is the
autonomy desired by the nations and the limits imposed by the IMF as to
the extent of interdependence caused primarily by the membership policy
of the IMF, which goes far beyond into the international sphere. 66 For
example, in an attempt to control its financial instability, Brazil, under
the IMF-support program set in 2000, had to undertake commitments
with international investors' interest necessitating political changes in the
country in order to fulfill these requirements that were against the coun-
try's interest.
Accordingly, IMF conditionality provides an efficient way to improve
monetary policies toward the country's desire to achieve a robust
growth.67 According to Manuel Guitidn, "conditionality practices help[ ]
make operational the link between macroeconomic and microeconomic
management by stressing its importance for balance of payments adjust-
ment."'68 But Guitiin also states that the effectiveness of IMF condition-
ality will depend "on the member country's ability to underpin market
forces when it points to needed adjustments. '69
IV. EFFECTS OF IMF STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY ON
THE BRAZILIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Brazil joined the IMF on January 14, 1946 and since then has been
supported by its financial arrangement. 70 Interestingly, Brazil is recover-
62. The level of those changes made in the constitution is not considered as exclusively
requested by the IMF. But the "insights" given by the IMF to the Government
regarding economic policy decision-making has made Brazil adjust its financial
policies to fulfill the conditionality requirements. Thus, Brazil made significant
changes to its monetary system, banking regulations, and the role of the Central
Bank to qualify for assistance, as required by the Articles of Agreement.
63. See Mario I. Blejer et al., Inflation Targeting in the Context of IMF-Supported Ad-justment Programs, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 313 (2002), available at http:H
www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2002/03/pdf/blejer.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 315.
66. See Manuel Guiti~n, Fiscal Adjustment, supra note 56, at 112, 127 (stating that the
understandings between the member and the IMF are the line of demarcation
caused when the member is "in use" of the resource provided by the IMF).
67. Guitiin, Fiscal Adjustment, supra note 56, at 112, 127..
68. See Guitiin, Conditionality, supra note 54, at 821.
69. Id. at 822.
70. See generally Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Com-
pletes Ninth Review Under Brazil's Stand-By Arrangement, Dec. 15, 2004, availa-
ble at http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/sec/pr/2004/prO4266.htm (hereinafter IMF
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ing from financial problems with regards to its monetary stabilization and
its social credibility, which has been affected by the Brazilians since the
new president (Lula) and his staff took the office in 2003. Henceforth,
Brazilian authorities are considering whether or not to draw under the
stand-by arrangement as previously addressed. 71 The Lula administra-
tion has been responsible for important changes. For instance, financial
and political changes have made Brazil a more competitive developing
country in dealing with the world globalization.
Professor Siglitz once stated that "this capital market liberalization
raged as the prime battleground between those who were pushing for and
against globalization."'72 Taking this statement into account, Brazil was
therefore under this ongoing performance to reduce its obligations before
the IMF by SDR 2.9 billion (which represents about US$4.44 billion in
2004).73 Nevertheless, a final review was conducted by March 31, 2005, in
which Brazilian officials stated that it would not renew.74
Under the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the drafters were concerned
about two important issues that (1) the IMF could provide assurance to
its members that the committed resources would be available to them
upon compliance with agreed policies,75 and (2) the IMF should have
confidence that the member country will be able to repay the money in-
vested.76 Therefore, though conditionality is not expressly stated in the
Articles of Agreement, its structural framework is, however, expressed by
a strong role in monitoring and enforcing compliance upon its members.
December 2004 Press Release). During the seven years Brazil has been under the
Stand-By Agreement, it has drawn a total of SDR 17.2 billion, about U.S. $26.36
billion. Id. But Brazil has not used the source since September 2003, and "[t]he
authorities are treating the arrangement as precautionary as part of a strategy to
exit from IMF financial support." Id.
71. See id.; see also IMF March 2005 Press Release, supra note 4; Ana Paula Ribeiro,
Palocci sinaliza que pais ndo deve renovar acordo corn o FMI [Palocci Signals that
Country Should Not Renew Agreement with the IMF], FOLHA ONLINE, Oct. 2,
2005, http://www.folha.uo.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u93309.shtml. Antonio
Palocci, Finance Minister of Brazil, stating at a Feb. 10, 2005 interview that he does
not see any necessity whatsoever for Brazil to renew the agreement with the IMF
(Stand-By Agreement), but also stating this is not a complete certainty. Id.
72. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Capital Market Liberalization and Exchange Rate Regimes: Risk
without Reward, 579 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 219, 220 (2002).
73. See International Monetary Fund, Brazil: IMF Credit Outstanding as of March 31,
2008, www.imf.org (under "Country info," select "Brazil;" then on the left, select
"Brazil: Financial Position in the Fund", then "Credit Outstanding") [hereinafter
IMF Credit Outstanding].
74. Id.; see also IMF March 2005 Press Release, supra note 4; see generally Morris
Goldstein, Debt Sustainability, Brazil, and the IMF (Inst. for Int'l Econ., Working
Paper No. 03-1, 2003), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/2003/03-
1.pdf (describing a more comprehensive approach on the Brazilian debt and the
mechanism forecasting its performance); Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, A Brazil-
ian-Type Debt Crisis: Simple Analytics, 51 IMF STAFF PAPERS 148 (2004), available
at http://www.imf.orglExternalUPubsFTstaffp2004/1Olpdf/razin.pdf.
75. See INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE (IEO), DRAFT ISSUES PAPER FOR AN EVALUA-
TION OF STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY IN IMF-SuPPORTED PROGRAMS 3 (2005),
available at http://imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2005/sc/031805.pdf.
76. Id.
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A. BANKING REGULATION FRAMEWORK
The effects of this relationship between Brazil and the IMF in underly-
ing obligations have lightly changed the banking regulation in Brazil. The
framework of financial institutions such as banks are established in Brazil
exclusively as public or private legal entities (e.g., corporations) 7 7 and can
operate their businesses solely with specific authorization (e.g., charters)
issued by regulatory entities. 78 Nevertheless, there are two different for-
malities. For instance, if the financial institution is a national legal entity,
the charter is issued by the Central Bank.79 Conversely, if it is a foreign
legal entity, the executive branch, pursuant to Law No. 4595, must decree
the charter as such.80 The National Monetary Council, along with the
Central Bank of Brazil and the Brazilian Security Commission (known in
Portuguese as CVM) are fundamental parts comprising the National
Monetary System.81
The Brazilian National Financial System was established in 1964 by en-
actment of Law No. 4595.82 Although under the military regime, which
prevailed on from 1964 to 1985, Law No. 4595 set forth a new beginning
of a better financial system framework. Many changes were yet to come,
but the Republic Federative of Brazil established new policies to stabilize
the Banking System and other Financial Entities. Thus, the National
Monetary Council has inter alia duties to formulate policy arrangements
in order to fulfill the purposes regarding the social and economic devel-
opment of Brazil.8 3
B. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
1. Constitutional Grounds
Although there is a discussion about the principles and rules of the
international law in the sense of constitution grounds, for example, the
1988's Constitution of Brazil treats external operation in the nature of
finance for the best interest of the Nation.8 4 Consequently, the IMF and
the established stand-by arrangements are intrinsically affected by some
constitutional legal issues.8 5
77. See NELSON ABRAO, DIREITo BANCARIO 3 (8th ed. 2002).
78. See id. at 20.
79. Id.
80. Lei No. 4595, de 31 de dezembro de 1964, D.O. de 31.1.1995 art 18 [hereinafter
Law No. 4595].
81. For an extensive work related to the development of banking system in Brazil and
other issues, see GERALDO Josg GUIMARAES DA SILVA & ANTONIO MARCIO DA
CUNHA GUIMARAES, DIRETO BANCARIO E TEMAS AFINS (2003).
82. See Law No. 4595, art. 18.
83. Id. art. 2. Social and economic development are the main and sine qua non func-
tion of a nation, and have been heavily discussed under debates involving the
IMF's exigencies upon major reforms needed in order to fulfill the conditionalities
imposed. See also IMF FUND-SUPPORT PROGRAM 2001, supra note 2.
84. See CONSTITUI(CAO FEDERAL Do BRAZIL [C.F.] (5 de outobro de 1988) (Braz.).
85. It is pertinent to mention that the stand-by arrangements established by the IMF
are conceded to support short-term funds (up to twelve or eighteen months) for
members facing financial problems, as the most common way provided by the
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The first operation taken by the Brazilian authorities under the ar-
rangements provided by Bretton Woods was for a loan to finance an elec-
trical project.86 In 1949, such an operation was financed in the amount of
U.S. $75 million and was also undertaken jointly by the World Bank.87 In
short, although Brazil and the IMF had already begun their relationship,
only in 1954 did Brazil have free access to draw under the IMF through
the Eximbank, which was a guarantor of financial export of the United
States.88
Additionally, the IMF recommended that Brazil, besides controlling
and changing its exchange ratio, had to also unify the regime of dealing
with it.89 But due to some continuing fiscal problems and tax issues, such
recommendations were not easy to implement. Even though there were
some irregular transactions with regards to the operational system, in
1957 Brazil became one of the important customers of both the IMF and
World Bank.90
Interestingly, article 192 of the Brazilian Constitution sets forth the na-
tional financial system framework. 91 It provides an important regulatory
framework to promote the balanced development of the country and to
serve the collective interests.92 But although article 192 plays an impor-
tant role in the structured Brazilian financial system, it was amended by
constitutional amendment no. 40 in 2003.93 The new caput of article 192
now states that in order to give effect to its provision, it depends on a
supplementary law to support its effectiveness. 94 Therefore, Law 4595
was enacted in 1994 to embrace such a constitutional condition.95 This
new provision became the new and most current financial regulatory
provision.96
IMF. Unfortunately, since 1982, Latin America has been under the "sphere" of
crisis for external debt, being that it has been forced to adopt political arrange-
ments that have a huge decrease regarding the economic and social growth. See
IMF Factsheet - April 2008, IMF Lending, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/
facts/howlend.htm.
86. See e.g., ALMEIDA, supra note 16.
87. Id., Chapter IV.
88. Id. Furthermore, Brazil, under conditionality imposed by the IMF, had to control
the interest rate and floating capital in order to access the source.
89. Id.
90. See ALMEIDA, supra note 16 (providing the full story about the first entry of Brazil
before the Bretton Woods Institute).
91. See CONSTTUIHAO FEDERAL Do BRAZIL [C.F.] art. 192.
92. Id.
93. C.F. amend. 40. Amendment 40 also changed section V of article 163 and the
thrust of article 52 from the 1988 Constitution.
94. C.F. art. 192.
95. Law 4595; C.F. amend. 43.
96. C.F. amend. 43. The Brazilian Constitution is set forth by 250 articles and to date
has 45 amendments. From article 170 to 192, the Constitution addressees the eco-
nomic and financial order. In order to come up with legal reforms capable to
sustain the nation's development, the Congress-jointly with few political arrange-
ments-observed the needs of a more reliable financial scheme that would lend
Brazil sound financial growth and, thus, pave the way to fulfill conditionality im-
posed for international financial support.
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2. Bankruptcy Legislation
In an attempt to create a more stable market, one of the major legal
reforms in Brazil was the reform of bankruptcy legislation in 2004. 97 The
Brazilian authorities recognized that in order to prevail in a stable market
and keep on going into a solid growth-as a way to attract new investors
and undertake IMF conditionalities-Brazil should change its bankruptcy
legislation. The bankruptcy legislation involves-in a sense of organiza-
tion-sharing of losses among different stakeholders. 98 Indeed, the new
bankruptcy legislation gives a more feasible method to the settlement of
guaranteed loans and makes the restructuring of firms in financial distress
more cooperative and conducive to recovery. 99
Moreover, the Executive Board of the IMF requested that the Brazil-
ian Government take advantage of its favorable economic context to fix
structural weaknesses while the IMF does its periodic performance-
checking on its member countries' balances.100 In fact, the IMF is refer-
ring to the actual economic context of Brazil as a great opportunity to
reduce its high level of poverty as well as social inequality.10 1
Such "adequate recommendations" affected indirectly the decision-
making power by which the nation has undertaken with the IMF under
the commitment. 10 2 For example, there are two-part processes that a na-
tion must undertake in order to draw from a "stand-by arrangement.' 10 3
The first part is called the letter of intent. The borrowing nation must
first accept the visit of an IMF delegation that works jointly reviewing its
own assessment of the conditions for such monetary assistance.10 4
C. THE CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL
1. Macroeconomic Policy
Unlike the United States, the Central Bank of Brazil is not an indepen-
dent institution. 10 5 The Central Bank of Brazil is, however, structured as
97. See generally OECD SURVEY OF BRAZIL 2005, supra note 46, at 62 (delving into
the bankruptcy regulation that was heavily discussed for many years, not only by
the IMF's executives, but also by the international community regarding the liabil-
ity and accountability for international investors urging such a legal reform.)
98. See e.g., CHARLES J. TABB AND RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW: PRINCI-
PLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE (2003); also, for a complete review about the
changes on the Bankruptcy Legislation of Brazil, see OECD SURVEY OF BRAZIL
2005, supra note 46, ch. 2.
99. See OECD SURVEY OF BRAZIL 2005, supra note 46, at 62.
100. See Public Information Notice, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Con-
cludes 2005 Article IV Consultation with Brazil, PIN No. 05/41 (Mar. 25, 2005),




103. See CYPHER & DIETZ, supra note 30, at 499.
104. Id.
105. See generally, Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Inde-
pendence 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 433, 434 (1998). According to Miller, "one of the
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a federal entity, which is a body of the National Financial System. 0 6 The
Central Bank of Brazil is chaired by one Governor, appointed by the Na-
tional Monetary Council, and four Directors. 10 7 Notwithstanding its reg-
ulatory duties and regardless of clear differences between functional and
administrative organization, the Central Bank of Brazil carries on the
business and the scale of its operations sharing a common characteristic
of financial services. 10 8 Although Brazil has considerably improved its
economy-based primarily on a macroeconomic policy where the Central
Bank plays an important role- and strengthened structural reforms;
some changes still remain as major challenges. 10 9
Structurally, the Central Bank of Brazil, under National Monetary
Council supervision, has strict powers to regulate the banking and finan-
cial system. Such responsibility allows it to make necessary changes re-
garding economic arrangements that perhaps the government may see as
crucial for development of the nation. The Central Bank of Brazil, how-
ever, as a result of enormous efforts made by the Brazilian authorities in
the light of the sound macroeconomic and the inflation-targeting frame-
work adopted, plays inter alia an important role as the counterpart ac-
countable for attaining decision set forth with the IMF. 10
The sound macroeconomic reforms taking place in Brazil have moved
its economy towards a steady state."' According to the IMF executive
board, Brazil has adopted "strong macroeconomic policies and the pur-
suit of ambitious structural reforms have restored macroeconomic stabil-
most remarkable features in the recent evolution of world finance has been the
emergence of independent central banks". Id.
106. See Law No. 4595, art 10.
107. See Law No. 4595, art. 11. Article 11 describes the National Monetary Council as a
federal body responsible for the issuance of regulatory provisions regarding the
control and governance of the financial system. Before the creation of the Central
Bank, the Brazilian monetary authorities were the Currency and Credit Superin-
tendence (SUMOC), the Bank of Brazil (BB) and the National Treasury. See also
History, Central Bank of Brazil, Ministry of Finance, http://www.bcb.gov.br/ingles/
sobre/historico-i.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
108. CENT. BANK OF BRAZ., SUPERVISION MANUAL (2003), available at https://
www3.bcb.gov.br/msv/pesquisa/validate.jsp.
109. See Country Focus Brazil, 41 FIN. & DEV. 56, Dec. 2004, available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/12/pdf/country.pdf.
110. See generally John William Anderson, Jr., Regulatory and Supervisory Indepen-
dence: Is there a Case for Independent Monetary Authorities in Brazil? 10 L. &
Bus. REV. AM. 253 (2004) (discussing the inflation-targeting framework adopted
in Brazil); see also Research Dep't, Cent. Bank of Braz., Issues in the Adoption of
an Inflation Targeting Framework in Brazil, in INFLATION TARGETING IN PRAC-
TICE: STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES AND APPLICATION TO EMERGING
MARKET ECONOMIES (IMF Seminar, May 3-5, 1999), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/targets/stratop.htm.
111. See generally Marcelo Neri & Josd Mircio Camargo, Structural reforms,
macroeconomic fluctuations and income distribution in Brazil, ECONOMIC REFORM
SERIES No. 39, Nov. 1999, available at http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/l/
4561/lcl1275i.pdf (discussing macroeconomic and income distribution in Brazil);
see also IMF Executive Board, supra note 100 (exploring a more recent overview
made by the IMF on the Brazilian performance in implementing macroeconomic
reforms).
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ity and fostered favorable conditions for growth."1" 2 In the light of this
stability, the Central Bank, however, with stronger capital flows, has been
allowed to rebuild international reserves, which also are deemed a conse-
quence of a monetary policy by keeping inflation low and controlled
within the target previously set forth. 113
2. Inflation Targeting
Brazil was the first inflation-targeting country with an IMF program. 114
By adopting inflation targeting, Brazil had to rely on the IMF's tradi-
tional monetary conditionality as regards the applicability of the Net Do-
mestic Asset (NDA) versus the Net International Reserves (NIR), which
was the progressive way for the adoption under the inflation targeting
framework.'1 5 Inflation-targeting programs work intrinsically with the
macroeconomic policy adopted by a country. Therefore, Brazilian au-
thorities had a wide rage of economic reforms to deal with to foster its
economy as well as to adjust the requirements made by the IMIF. 116 The
basic meaning of adopting an inflation-targeting strategy is "for con-
ducting monetary policy with the overriding and explicit objective of
achieving and maintaining price stability, represented by an easily under-
standable, numerical target value for inflation. 11 7 Thus, as previously
noted, the Central Bank of Brazil became an important piece of the puz-
zle to choose the combination of monetary policy instrument to achieve
the objectives and requirement of the IMF.
In sum, Brazil fulfilled all the preconditions1 8 set forth by the Fund-
support program for adopting an inflation-targeting regime. Conse-
quently, it has been experiencing a solid growth since then. Preconditions
are seen as the way the government, followed by the IMF's financial and
technical support, has forecasted the objectives regarded as targeted pri-
mary surplus.119 But remaining work needs to be done to avoid big sw-
ings in stability, which can impede Brazil's progress towards a steady
economic state.' 20
112. See IMF Executive Board, supra note 100. This Public Information Notice report-
ing the results of a review, states that "[u]nder Article IV of the IMF's Articles of
Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year.
A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and
discusses with officials the country's economic developments and policies." Id.
113. Id.
114. See Blejer, supra note 63, at 87.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 90.
118. For example, Brazil has undertaken, following the technical forecast of the IMF
primary surplus as 3.1 percent of GDP in 1999, 3.2 percent of GPD in 2000, and 3.3
percent of GPD and has fought greatly to accomplish those numbers in order to
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D. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PERSPECTIVES
In analyzing positive and negative perspectives regarding the current
Brazilian economy before the IMF's interest, some important considera-
tions must be met.121 The level of investment, the development of the
private sector, and the increased social confidence that generated more
interest with foreign investors and the international community are the
foremost, but not all of the essential reasons that have sustained the ro-
bust growth of the Brazilian economy. 122
On the other hand, in the global context, as U.S. deficits and other
major international turbulences may continue to interrupt such a growth,
Brazil, along with other developing countries should not "relax their
guard". 123 As Krueger explains, they should"[s]trengthen their economic
performance over the longer term. '124 Further, Andrew Dean, Deputy
Director of the OECD Economics Department, at a Getulio Vargas
Foundation seminar in Rio de Janeiro points out three main challenges
that Brazilian authorities should address in order to pave the way for
positive growth in the year to come. 125 First, Brazil should improve the
quality of on-going fiscal consolidation.1 26 Second, Brazil should improve
the investment climate.1 27 Lastly, Brazil should strengthen its social
policies.' 28
In addition, Brazil must work on important issues to prevent the occur-
rence of another crisis. In the middle of several negotiations, for exam-
ple, an issue arose whether the conditionality should or should not
change as regulatory performance for the use of the source provided by
the IMF. Fiscal policy and ratio targeting still remain, inter alia, the most
critical changes that a member country should deal with to fulfill condi-
tionalities imposed by the IMF.
V. WHAT IS ABOUT TO HAPPEN?
Taking into account strong and sound performance gained in these
years under the new presidential administration (Lula) as well as impor-
tant reforms in compliance with the IMF supervision throughout the de-
121. See OECD SURVEY OF BRAZIL 2005, supra note 46, ch. 3, at 93.
122. Id.
123. See Krueger Address 2005, supra note 38; see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (2005), avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.govfboarddocs/hh/2005/february/fullreport.pdf
(reviewing the U.S. economy).
124. Krueger Address 2005, supra note 38.
125. See Andrew Dean, Introductory Remarks at the Getulio Vargas Foundation semi-





2008] THE EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITIES 365
cades, Brazil is going to say a political good bye12 9 to the IMF's support
program. And consequently, although major changes remain, the main
argument for such an announcement from the Brazilian government is
the under-concentration of its trade surplus-approximately U.S. $35 bil-
lion, recovered over the past twelve years. 130 Furthermore, the increas-
ing international cash reserve of U.S. $61.9 billion, the stabilized inflation
rate, as well as the primary surplus that totals 4.25 percent of the GPD,
are also strong arguments for such a decision. 131
The announcement of renouncing the IMF's support, however, does
not represent the end of the strictness of the fiscal policy adopted by the
government. The finance minister Antonio Palloci states that "in the po-
litical world we never say good-bye for the other parties; what we can say
however is that Brazil has reached a solid economic position as never
before and therefore can stand on its own feet".' 32
VI. CONCLUSION
Although major changes still remain to pave Brazil's economy and le-
gal frameworks for solid growth in the years to come, "great powers"
with or without the IMF's support-program are aimed at supervising and
regulating either the financial system or international globalization. To
the extent that all these goals have yet to be achieved by the Brazilian
government, great responsibilities, therefore, undertaken by the Brazilian
authorities have found great domestic and international support and can
never be separated from the important role of the International Mone-
tary Fund conditionality as a paramount financial framework. Further-
more, as the new horizons glimmer, governance policy, debt managing,
and monetary policy continue to be crucial for sound performance and a
steady economic state.
129. Luciana Otoni & Karla Correia, Brasil Da Adeus Ao FMI Depois De Sete Anos




132. Id. The Brazilian government paid off U.S. $7.75 billion to the IMF in 2005, U.S.
$9.20 billion in 2006, and U.S. $9.09 billion in 2007, when it finally settled the
whole amount. See IMF Credit Outstanding, supra note 73.
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